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  2Abstract 
 
This paper examines the evolution of productive development policies in Latin 
America in the last half century, with an emphasis on the post-reform period.  The 
paper begins with a review of the import-substitution era and goes on to describe 
and make a preliminary assessment of the meaning and implications of productive 
development policies in the liberalization period.  
 
 
  3  41.  Introduction
1  
 
Productive development policies can be broadly defined as policies that aim to strengthen the 
productive structure of a particular national economy.
2  This broad definition includes any 
measure, policy or program aimed at improving the growth and competitiveness of large sectors 
of the economy (manufacturing, agriculture); specific sectors (textiles, automobile industry, 
software production, etc.); or the growth of certain key activities (research and development, 
exports, fixed capital formation, human capital formation).  The final objective is to raise growth 
and improve the competitiveness of the overall economy while maintaining a rising trend in 
living standards. Productive development policy can target specific products, activities or 
enterprises within a sector without necessarily targeting the sector as a whole. It can focus on 
horizontal issues directly related to production, such as technological innovation and investment, 
or focus on generic areas such as education, health and work habits that have an indirect effect 
on production.  Strictly speaking, productive development policies are not restricted to 
government policies, defined as the set of laws and regulations and other policy measures that 
delineate the business environment and the institutional framework in which firms operate. In 
fact, they encompass any short-, medium- or long-term program aimed at increasing growth and 
productivity whether formulated or executed by public, private, or non-governmental 
institutions. 
  This paper examines the evolution of productive development policies in Latin America 
in the last half century, with emphasis on the post-reform period.  The paper begins with a 
review of the import-substitution era (Section 2) and goes on to describe and make a preliminary 
assessment of the meaning and implications of productive development policies in the 
liberalization period (Section 3). 
 
2.  Productive Development Policies in the Import-Substitution Era 
 
Post-World War II development policy in Latin America, as in most less developed countries 
(LDCs), was inspired by two ideas: first, that economic development is the process by which a 
poor country evolves into an economy exhibiting the broad characteristics of the developed 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank Eduardo Lora and Mauricio Cárdenas for their comments to previous versions of 
this paper.      
2 Our definition closely follows the definition of industrial policy proposed by the Industrial Modernisation Centre 
(2003).  
  5countries of that era, especially the strength of their manufacturing sectors; and second, that the 
market alone is unable to produce this transformation. There were several rationalizations for this 
second idea, including declining and volatile relative prices of the primary exports of LDCs 
(Prebisch, 1950), dynamic (external) economies of scale favoring industry more than agriculture 
(the infant industry argument for protection; see Bruton, 1998); multiplicity of imperfections in 
domestic markets that prevented resources from flowing into sectors with the highest returns; 
and investment lumpiness and economies of scale that created “natural monopolies” leading to 
the need for coordinated investments across multiple sectors for any individual project to be 
profitable (Rosenstain-Rodan, 1943).  
  This was a development challenge whose solution at the time required massive 
government intervention at multiple levels: trade protection in the form of high tariffs and quotas 
for certain industries; investment subsidies and subsidized loans; regulation to prevent 
competition in certain areas so that companies could exploit economies of scale; and direct 
public investment in natural monopolies and industries that were either important for 
downstream industries or that represented such large commitments that it was unrealistic to 
expect the private sector to undertake them (i.e., to induce a “big push”). This massive 
government intervention implied an enormous transformation of the state, with new ministries 
and public agencies set up to perform the many new tasks associated with the new development 
policy. The state created national development and commercial banks, new utilities, and holding 
companies to administer public investments in a variety of manufacturing and agricultural 
operations. Ministries expanded to take on a wide range of new regulatory and subsidy activities. 
Planning ministries were created to develop multi-year public investment plans.  
Overall, the state grew significantly, and its new functions led to concentration of power 
and discretionary action that were generally not matched by strict requirements for results and 
accountability. The objective of this section is to describe in some detail the policies of this era 
and their implications for the state. We focus on the two most important areas: commercial 
policy and investment policy. After a brief review of the policies implemented, we turn to a 
discussion on the implications of these policies for the state. 
 
  62.1.  Trade Policy 
 
The views on trade and development in the late 1940s and the 1950s were very different from 
those that are generally held today. There was nothing at that time like the miraculous growth 
rates of the export-oriented economies of East Asia during the 1970s and 1980s to convince 
economists and policymakers of the positive role that trade could play in the development 
process. On the contrary, as Lindauer and Pritchett (2002) emphasize, the “economic miracle” 
was the Soviet Union! It was hard for most people to accept that trade opening could transform a 
poor economy specialized in agriculture into a rich industrialized economy. As Bruton (1998) 
clearly stated, the prevailing view was that the existence of already industrialized economies in 
the North meant that, in order to industrialize, the countries of the South had to protect “their 
economies from imports from the North and concentrate on putting in place new activities that 
will produce an array of manufactured products currently imported. Thus the structure of the 
economy would be changed and, at some future time, make possible a foreign trade that 
contributes to the development objectives” (p. 904).  
Import duties were the main instrument for protecting the market, although they were 
generally supplemented by quotas. As shown in Table 1, adopted from Edwards (1994), average 
tariffs were very high in the region, with Central American countries exhibiting some of the 
highest average tariffs in the world. When quotas are converted to their tariff equivalents, the 
rate of protection increases substantially in most Latin American countries.  
 
Table 1. Import Protection in the Developing World: 1985 (percentages) 
 
  Total tariff protection (a)  Non-tariff barriers coverage (b) 
South America  51 60 
Central America  66 100 
Caribbean  17 23 
North Africa  39 85 
Other Africa  36 86 
West Asia  5 11 
Other Asia  25 21 
 
(a)  Includes tariffs and para-tariffs. 
(b)  Measures lines covered by non-tariff barriers as a percentage of imports. The data on both tariffs and NTBs 
reported here are weighted averages. 
Source: Edwards (1994), based on data from Erzan et al. (1989) 
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dispersion across goods, which led to high effective rates of protection for some industries, and 
to more cumbersome and complex custom procedures and administration. According to Balassa 
(1971) and Little et al. (1970), Brazil, Chile and Mexico had some of the most distorted trade 
regimes in the world with very high variance in effective rates of protection (ERPs) across 
industries. Lin (1988) compared trade policies in Korea, Taiwan and Argentina during the 1970s 
and found that the ERP rates in the manufacturing sector were –1 percent in Korea, 19 percent in 
Taiwan, and almost 100 percent in Argentina.  
Many countries moved to regional trading arrangements, with the idea that infant 
industry protection would take place in larger markets with economies of scale. This was 
particularly the case in the Central American Common Market and the Andean Pact, both created 
in the 1960s. This trend led to the need to negotiate tariffs at a very detailed level, and even more 
to cumbersome customs procedures and requirements to validate origin and content. 
One result of strong protection was the creation of an anti-export bias, which resulted in 
low rates of export growth in many countries. A common reaction was the creation of tax 
incentives and subsidies for exports, which lessened the anti-export bias to some extent, but 
clearly imposed even stronger demands on bureaucracies to control and allocate the incentives.  
The resulting trade policy was complex and imposed heavy demands on the state 
apparatus in terms of its design (although, as Balassa and Little et al. show, this does not appear 
to have produced the intended results), implementation, and constant revision.  
 
2.2.  Investment Policy 
 
The view after World War II was that investment was crucial for economic development. There 
is no better way of making this point than to quote Arthus Lewis: “The central problem in the 
theory of economy growth is to understand the process by which a community is converted from 
being a 5% saver to a 12% saver” (Lewis 1955, pp. 325-26).  Aid to developing countries was 
viewed primarily as a way of alleviating this savings constraint on investment and growth. 
Moreover, governments used their ability to borrow to finance a growing share of total 
investment, which was used not only for infrastructure, but also to invest in large-scale 
commercial ventures that were considered too large or strategic to be left in private hands. The 
public share of investment grew substantially, only to decrease again in the 1980s as a 
  8consequence of the financial crisis. For example, the public-sector share in total investment 
increased from less than 20 percent in the early 1960s to more than 30 percent in the mid-1970s 
in Costa Rica, whereas the share of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in total capital stock 
increased from around 12 percent to close to 20 percent in the same period (Rodríguez-Clare et 
al., 2002). The creation of SOEs also led to a sizable increase in the share of GDP that was 
contributed by the state. This share declined subsequently in the 1990s as a direct result of the 
privatization efforts in many LDCs. Little et al. (1993) calculated similar numbers for other Latin 
American countries and found that SOEs accounted for almost 30 percent of total investment in 
Mexico in the 1970-73 period, with Chile and Argentina recording 20 percent and 17.5 percent, 
respectively. As shown in Table 2, this phenomenon was widespread among LDCs. 
 
Table 2.  Change in SOE activity as percentage of GDP  
(Decrease in percentage points of GDP) 
 
Countries (by income 
group) 
1980  1997  Change 
Low-income countries  15  3  -12 
Lower middle-income 
countries 
11 5  -6 
Upper middle-income 
countries 
10.5 5  -5.5 
High-income  countries  6 5 -1 
 
Source: Sheshinski and López-Calva (1998). 
 
One immediate consequence of the increase in the importance of public investment was 
the need for some kind of medium-term plan, which led to the creation of Planning Ministries or 
Agencies in most Latin American countries. In fact, multilateral financial institutions often 
imposed such plans as conditions for investment loans. In the words of Bruton: “By the early 
1960s virtually every developing country had something that was called a plan… Almost all 
plans announced a growth (of GDP and some sectors) target and then allocated the anticipated 
investment among the sectors of the economy believed necessary to achieve the target” (p. 911). 
  9Another area where the State assumed a key role was banking. In many Latin American 
countries, banks were nationalized in the 1940s and 1950s. In most of them the share of the 
State’s banking transacted through public banks increased dramatically. By 1970, the share of 
banking assets held by public banks in the region reached 70 percent. This ratio fell significantly 
in the following decades, and the State’s role shifted toward regulation and supervision rather 
than banking (see IDB, 2005). 
The state’s role in promoting investment did not end there. Apart from direct investment, 
private investment was subsidized in areas considered consistent with the development strategy. 
This was done through tariff exemptions on imported equipment and subsidized interest rates, 
although direct subsidies were also granted for certain private projects. 
  
2.3.  Implications for the State 
 
As mentioned above, import substitution involved a complex structure of tariffs, other import 
levies and quotas that varied across fine categories of goods and were constantly being 
renegotiated between regional partners—or changed unilaterally. This situation created the need 
for a technical bureaucracy to take charge of the task, which was usually the Ministry of 
Economy and/or Industry. With unilateral liberalization and GATT membership, however, the 
tariff structure became much simpler. Surcharges and quotas were eliminated, making the State 
bureaucracy much less important. Instead, with the new emphasis on outward-oriented free-trade 
agreements (FTAs), a group of technocrats able to understand and negotiate such modern GATT-
compatible agreements became essential. This group has generally been placed in new ministries 
(e.g., COMEX in Costa Rica) or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as in Brazil and Chile. The 
result is that the balance of power has shifted within government from the ministry of Economics 
to the ministry of Foreign Affairs or Foreign Trade.  
Something similar has happened in the area of investment policy. As mentioned earlier, 
the emphasis on investment and the high rates of public investment required planning, which in 
most cases was done by planning ministries or agencies, which became very powerful in the 
1960s. With the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, however, public investment decreased, along 
with the role of SOEs. This decline gradually weakened these ministries, to the point where in 
some countries there has been talk of closing them down. The role of investment planning is now 
mostly done at the Treasury, which has the real power to control the budget. 
  10The role of the state as producer almost disappeared, except for utilities and certain 
services such as banking. The SOEs that remained acquired more restrictions and controls, and 
the idea that state companies should behave like private companies almost disappeared. 
Likewise, the agencies supervising  SOEs also disappeared from the scene.  
Instead of “picking winners,” the new incentives were supposed to strive to be sector-
neutral. The trend was towards transparency and eventual inclusion in the budget, except for tax 
incentives for foreign direct investment (FDI). The new incentives were also automatic, rather 
than discretionary. The offices and bureaucrats in charge of assigning incentives to particular 
firms vanished, and instead offices or agencies emerged to check that certain well-defined 
criteria were being satisfied in order to merit subsidies or tax breaks.   
In short, the trend in industrial policy has had several implications for the state. First,  the 
state has become smaller, with less discretionary power, acting under tougher and clearer 
restrictions, with more accountability and transparency. Second, the presence of powerful 
ministries, such as Planning and Economy, which were intended to plan and supervise large 
investments, enforce regulations and allocate incentives, greatly diminished, giving way to a 
network of more decentralized agencies specializing in tasks such as export promotion, attracting 
FDI, anti-trust, etc.  
 
3.   Productive Development Policies in the Liberalization Period 
   
3.1  Industrial Policy’s Quiet Return 
 
It is well known that processes of radical policy change tend to overshoot the mark.  The 
rejection of the productive development policies characteristic of the import-substitution 
approach led, in many quarters, to the rejection of any and every industrial or sector policy.  The 
possibility that there could be a set of productive development policies both consistent with the 
structural reform process and necessary under the new conditions of more open economies was 
frequently rejected out of hand.  It is obvious that the underlying idea that market forces would 
spontaneously lead to an optimal reallocation of resources as a matter of course following the 
liberalizing reforms was a major factor in this intellectual and policy attitude.  
Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s there was a noticeable change in the policy atmosphere 
and policymakers’ attitudes towards productive development policies. The feeling was growing 
among economic agents and decision-makers that structural reforms were not delivering the 
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restructuring process and the unintended undesirable outcomes of the reforms created conditions 
favorable to the emergence of a new type of industrial policy consistent with the new, market-
oriented development strategy adopted by most countries in the region.  The conditions were ripe 
for what Peres (1997) called, in an early and prescient diagnosis, the resurgence of industrial 
policies in Latin America and the Caribbean.        
Melo (2001) examined the ensuing shift in the direction of industrial policies in several 
key Latin American and Caribbean countries and found that it had three remarkable features.  
First, he claimed that the new industrial policies were adopted almost simultaneously in a large 
number of countries in the mid-1990s; as several significant policy pronouncements were made 
in the three-year period 1994-1996 in various key countries.  Second, in most leading countries 
the change took the form of the adoption and announcement of explicit, medium-to-long-term 
plans, programs, and/or strategies for the industrial sector.  Third, the policy shift was generally 
the outcome of (or was broadly related to) a public debate about the effects of structural reforms 
and the need to improve the competitiveness of domestic industry in the new context of a more 
open national economy.  We should add that the new industrial policies came to be juxtaposed in 
variable and complex ways with the remnants of the policies and institutions of the import-
substitution era.   
The new productive development policies in Latin America and the Caribbean continue 
to be an emerging phenomenon.  Their defining feature can be encapsulated in the key idea that 
the new industrial polices are aimed at improving the competitiveness of domestic producers in 
the new, more integrated and open world economy.  Instead of being designed to circumvent 
market outcomes, they seek to redress market failures through the provision of public goods and 
government intervention to stimulate the supply of goods with positive externalities.  As Melo 
(2001) pointed out, the animating spirit behind the emerging policies is not to seek to return   to 
the import substitution model.  Such a return is considered to be out of the question. Nor do they 
aim at interfering with the market mechanism through a systematic and generalized use of 
arbitrary subsidies.  Moreover, in contrast to many policymakers of the import substitution era, 
their proponents do not overlook the importance of macroeconomic stability and sound 
macroeconomic policies. On the contrary, macroeconomic stability is not only explicitly but 
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industrial modernization.   
A key generic feature of the new approaches to productive development policies in the 
region is that they attempt to address a core set of issues (such as productivity, efficiency, 
product quality, etc.) revolving around the central question of how to raise countries’ 
competitiveness.  The obvious underlying assumptions are that trade liberalization was necessary 
and is here to stay; that it is not only desirable but possible to change the prevailing world 
distribution of comparative advantages so as to increase the region’s exports of manufactured 
goods (and even high-technology goods and services) and decrease dependence on primary-
sector exports ; and, lastly, that the government has a role to play in this task. 
The next section is a general survey of the emerging productive development policies 
adopted in the region.  The discussion covers the policies and the institutions that implement 
them so as to give a view of how the adoption of the new policies has shaped the institutional 
and organizational structures of the states of Latin America and the Caribbean.
3
 
3.2.  Current Industrial Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean: Alternative Approaches 
and Key Components   
 
The discussion of current productive development policies in Latin America is divided into two 
parts.  The first is a general discussion of emerging alternative approaches in the region, 
centering on what we call the two-paradigm hypothesis, a concept to be presently explained.   In 
the second part, the components of current industrial policies are dissected so as to provide an 
overall picture of their scope and content. 
 
3.2.1  The Two-Paradigm Hypothesis 
 
The two-paradigm hypothesis contends that two styles of or approaches to industrial 
policymaking are emerging in the region.  The first, the demand-driven approach, emphasizes 
responding to the needs of existing sectors in the private economy, with the main aim of raising 
their international competitiveness.  The second, the strategy-driven approach, is characterized 
by its emphasis on crisp definitions of the desired medium- and long-term changes in the vector 
                                                 
3 Our survey of the emerging productive development policies in the region draws heavily on ECLAC (2004) and 
Melo (2001).  
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small number of industries.   
To explore in greater detail the characteristics of the two paradigms, it may be helpful to 
compare and contrast the ways in which productive development policies are conceived, 
designed and implemented in the best empirical representatives of the two paradigms. In the case 
of the strategy-driven approach, the best representative is Brazil.  The demand-driven approach 
is best represented by Colombia’s productive development policies. 
 
3.2.1.1 The Demand-Driven Approach 
 
In Colombia, the discussion and definition of productive development policies and actions has 
largely revolved around a public-private partnership and dialogue that has resulted in a set of 
organizational vehicles and instruments.
4  The first steps were taken in 1994 with the creation of 
the National Competitiveness Council, a body that reports directly to the Office of the President 
of the Republic, formerly under the technical direction of the now-defunct Ministry of Economic 
Development.   The government adopted a strategy based on opening a dialogue with the private 
sector on the definition of Competitiveness Agreements by production chain; these agreements 
were aimed at improving the business environment and raising productivity.  A quantum leap 
took place in 1999 with the start of the National Conferences on Productivity and 
Competitiveness (NCPCs), conceived as fora for the public-private dialogue.  The first of these 
Conferences, held that year in Cartagena, was a trend-setting event.  President Pastrana presented 
the National Policy for Productivity and Competitiveness (NPPC), invited the private sector to 
work jointly to achieve the objectives of the NPPC, and proposed the principles of (i) joint public 
and private responsibility for the results, and (ii) the accountability of public officials for the 
commitments assumed by the government in the half-yearly meetings of the National 
Conference.  These meetings have since become a key institution for the public-private dialogue 
and for policy discussion.  The NCPC is without doubt the most important private-public forum 
in Colombia.                                
The spirit of public-private dialogue was further deepened with the setting up of the 
Colombia Competes Network and the Regional Advisory Committees for Foreign Trade 
(CARCEs in their Spanish acronym).  The Colombia Competes Network is not a single network, 
                                                 
4 The description of the Colombian model of policymaking and dialogue draws heavily on Velasco (2003).   
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revolve around problem-diagnosis and problem-solving in relation to a key factor that plays a 
determinant role in shaping competitiveness. The selection of the factors was guided by the main 
determinants of a country’s competitiveness used by the World Economic Forum, with suitable 
adaptations.  The 10 networks are the following: Science and Technology, Finance, 
Internationalization of the Economy, Institutions, Management, Education, Labor, Infrastructure, 
Transportation, and Telecommunications, Energy, and Gas.  These specialized networks are an 
institutionalized meeting point and communication structure where representatives of the 
national government, business sector, workers, regional and local governments, and academia 
make a joint diagnosis of the situation in relation to the particular factor and a policy and 
practical dialogue aimed at formulating solutions and programming actions. 
The Regional Advisory Committees for Foreign Trade are seen as an instrument of a 
decentralization strategy.  The underlying idea is that competitiveness has an inescapable 
regional dimension.  The CARCEs are bodies for public-private dialogue and policy discussion 
at the regional level.  They were assigned the task of formulating Regional Export Strategic 
Plans in which they were expected to: (i) identify the comparative advantages and export 
potential of their region; (ii) establish a system to support investment projects; (iii) identify 
priorities for action; and (iv) design and execute a plan to foster an export-oriented, 
entrepreneurial culture in their region. 
A crucial part of the public-private partnership is the signing of Export-Oriented 
Competitiveness Agreements between the national government and the entrepreneurs and trade 
organizations of a particular production chain.  The basic objectives are to raise productivity and 
improve the competitiveness of the production chain.  The Agreements include commitments by 
both the public and private sectors. 
The Colombian experience has strongly influenced other countries.  Similar processes of 
public-private partnership and dialogue in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Peru have typically led to the establishment of National Competitiveness Councils 
with (variable) private-sector participation and to the definition of National Competitiveness 
Plans or Strategies that combine the views of government and business in these countries.                 
The Colombian approach to industrial policymaking is a bottom-up approach.  The 
Colombian government basically directs its entire organizational, policymaking, and activity 
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Policy, the National Conferences for Productivity and Competitiveness, the Export-Oriented 
Competitiveness Agreements, and the Regional Advisory Committees for Foreign Trade.  As far 
as we know, since the replacement of the Ministry of Economic Development by the new 
Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism, there has not been a single policy pronouncement or 
document from the Colombian authorities or governmental institutions containing a statement on 
the need for the government to create and develop new production chains or new industries as 
part of a medium-to-long-term development strategy.
5  The reference to this missing component 
in the Colombian approach sets the stage for the discussion of the alternative approach—the 
strategy-driven approach. 
 
3.2.1.2 The Strategy-Driven Approach 
On the face of it, industrial policymaking in Brazil seems to follow a more traditional style.  The 
Central Government defines and executes policy through an array of agencies.  A new industrial 
policy was launched in April 2004, and early in 2005 the Brazilian Agency for Industrial 
Development (known by its Portuguese acronym ABDI) was created to coordinate the various 
agencies, execute industrial policies, and monitor their progress.   
The key point is that Brazilian industrial policy has a clear-cut strategic view of the need 
to select a small set of industrial sectors as the target for promotion through selective, vertical 
policies.  In other words, Brazilian policy is the expression of a definite political will to change 
the vector of goods and services produced by the economy in a particular direction, and not 
                                                 
5 The absence of such a policy pronouncement has not always been the case in Colombia.  As late as 2000, a policy 
document from the (now defunct) Colombian Ministry of Economic Development made a distinction between 
existing production chains that required further strengthening and development, and new production chains that 
should be promoted to help the country enter markets where, for the most part, it was (and still is) absent.  The 
document included the following sectors in the latter category: information technology and software; 
microelectronics; biotechnology and biomedicine; new materials; fine chemicals; capital goods; and 
communications (see Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico de Colombia, 2000, and Melo, 2001).  There is no 
evidence, however, that real practical initiatives and fiscal and institutional resources were allocated at that time to 
develop these new, mainly high-technology-based sectors.  This lack of action is obviously very relevant in 
assessing the design of productive development policy in a number of countries in the region, and we will return to 
this in the concluding section.   The absence of any mention of efforts to actively promote new sectors in recent 
Colombian policy statements is in fact due to a change in the orientation of the country’s productive development 
policies that goes back to the beginning of this decade.  Three expressions of this change were: (i) the substitution of 
the Ministry of Economic Development by the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism, mentioned earlier; (ii) the 
removal of any reference to changes in the production structure as a strategic goal; and (iii) a terminological change 
in which the phrase “industrial policies” in the policy documents was replaced by references to “competitiveness 
policies.”               
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sectors.  The industrial sectors selected for special attention fall into two categories. The first 
category consists of what is called, in Brazilian policy terminology, a set of “strategic options.”  
The strategic-option sectors are (1) semiconductors; (2) computer software; (3) pharmaceutical 
products; and (4) capital goods (Governo Federal do Brasil, 2003). Second, there is a set of 
industrial sectors that Brazilian policymakers label—rather poetically—“bearers of the future,” 
presumably because of their potentially profound effect on productivity and competitiveness.  
The three specific sectors are: (1) biotechnology, (2) nanotechnology, and (3) biomass energy 
production (Jaguaribe, 2004; Teixeira, 2005). 
Private-sector participation is also important in this approach.  The key Brazilian policy 
document explicitly states that “both the multiplicity of situations and firm-level specificities 
reaffirm the need for the Industrial, Technological, and Foreign Trade Policy to be discussed and 
negotiated with the private sector since this is responsible for productive investments and 
industrial production” (Governo Federal do Brazil, 2003, p.10), while the newly constituted 
ABDI is to be governed by a Deliberative Council of eight members from government and seven 
from the private sector and civil society.
6  In addition, production-chain-specific competitiveness 
fora have been organized as instruments of a public-private partnership whose task is to tackle 
issues that affect the competitiveness of selected production chains, an issue that will be 
discussed below.     
A strategy-driven approach has been adopted in only a handful of countries. Besides 
Brazil, only Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela can be classified in this group.  Costa 
Rica is a special case that deserves careful consideration.  As one of the authors of this paper has 
concluded, Costa Rica’s development strategy is based on technology and human capital, with 
FDI and high-tech multinationals playing the leading role (Rodríguez-Clare, 2001).  However, 
two features differentiate Costa Rica’s approach to attracting foreign investment.  First, in the 
context of a strong public-private partnership, the private sector, represented by the Costa Rican 
Coalition for Development Initiatives (CINDE in its Spanish acronym), plays a major role in 
attracting FDI.  Second, since the early 1990s the strategy has focused on a few sectors.  For 
                                                 
6 The seven non-governmental members represent the following organizations: Confederaçao Nacional da Industria 
(CNI), Agencia de Promoçao de Exportaçoes e Investimentos (APEX-Brasil), Confederaçao Nacional do Comércio 
(CNC); Serviço Brasileiro de Apoio a Pequena e Média Empresa (SEBRAE); Central Unica dos Trabalhadores 
(CUT); Instituto de Estudos Para O Desenvolvimento Industrial (IEDI); and Associaçao Nacional de Entidades 
Promotoras de Empreendimentos Innovadores (ANPROTEC).    
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industries (Rodríguez-Clare, 2001). 
Having outlined the main features of both approaches in an admittedly schematic manner, 
it is important to clarify that many features are common to both approaches.  The two approaches 
share all the general features of the emerging industrial policies in Latin America described in 
the previous sub-sections, along with many concepts, issues, and policies. 
What explains the emergence of these two approaches? We suggest a preliminary 
hypothesis that combines political economy determinants with institutional factors.  In terms of 
this hypothesis, for a strategy-driven approach to become dominant in a country, the confluence 
of at least two of the following three factors is required: (i) a sufficiently strong technical and 
social-scientific intelligentsia, (ii) government institutions where this technical intelligentsia can 
exercise its intellectual influence,
7 and (iii) a nucleus of private entrepreneurs capable of going 
beyond a short-term corporatist stance and of interacting with the technical intelligentsia to 
generate a long-run, strategic perspective for productive development policies.  In the Latin 
American experience, the technical and social-scientific intelligentsia sees itself as representing 
both the standpoint of the country’s future and the interests of technical rationality.  But (i) if this 
social segment is weak; (ii) if it is not sufficiently represented in the state bureaucracy; (iii) if the 
specialized agencies through which it expresses its views and technical interests are weak or non-
existent; and (iv) if it does not have an ally in (at least a segment of) the entrepreneurial class, it 
cannot become a dominant factor influencing public policy, and there is thus no possibility of 
developing a strategy-driven approach in a particular country. 
In the absence of a strong technical intelligentsia expressing itself through strong, capable 
institutions (and possibly allied with a segment of the business class with a long-term outlook), 
the kind of political-economy regimes prevailing in Latin American countries spontaneously 
bring about productive development policies that are basically shaped by the political influence 
of existing production sectors and where long-term strategic considerations take a back seat.  In 
this situation the approach that ends up prevailing is the demand-driven approach. 
 
                                                 
7 The government agencies we have in mind are planning agencies, public development banks, industry and trade 
ministries, science and technology agencies, and foreign trade agencies.       
  183.3 Overview of Current Industrial Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean   
 
Understood in a broad sense, productive development policies usually cover a diverse set of 
elements: trade policies, investment policies, science and technology policies, policies for the 
promotion of micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises, human-resource training and 
upgrading policies, and regional development policies.  For the purposes of this survey, a simple 
taxonomy will be used to classify and describe the emergent industrial polices of the region.  For 
the discussion in this part of the paper, the industrial-policy set will be partitioned into three 
different classes: (a) export promotion policies; (b) policies to promote innovation, higher 
productivity and competitiveness; and (c) policies to promote output growth and investment.  
Some words are in order to explain and justify the distinction between the second and third 
categories.  The idea is to distinguish between policies whose main effect is to increase present 
and future output and policies that change the way output is produced, presumably in the sense 
of increasing technical and economic efficiency.  The set in category (c) of the proposed 
classification consists of policies that create incentives for producers to, as it were, “do more of 
the same.”  In contrast, policies in category (b) aim to encourage them “to change their ways,” 
i.e., to produce more efficiently.  In other words, while, in its pure form, the first policy set leads 
directly to increases in output and investment allowing firms to leave their production functions 
unchanged, the second set is deliberately designed to alter firms’ production functions.
8   
       
3.3.1  Export Promotion Policies   
 
Export promotion policies in Latin American and the Caribbean are presented in two parts. The 
first (Section 3.3.1.1) is a brief description. The second part (Section 3.3.1.2) proposes several 
ideas for assessing the effectiveness of those policies.   
 
3.3.1.1 Export Promotion in the Region: The Policies  
 
Export promotion policies in the region can be classified into five broad categories: (i) fiscal 
incentives; (ii) financial incentives; (iii) incentives for export processing zones; (iv) incentives 
                                                 
8 It goes without saying that this distinction is purely analytical.  It would be hard to find pure examples of the two 
types of policies in the real world.  However, it is not unreasonable to assert that horizontal lines of credit to finance 
working capital are essentially a policy of the first type, and incentives for technological innovation are essentially a 
policy of the second type.     
  19for trade in services; and (v) support for exporters’ efforts to access and penetrate foreign 
markets.    
Fiscal Tax Incentives.   Fiscal tax incentives for exports have a long tradition in the 
region. They were initiated in the 1960s under the import-substitution regime in countries such 
as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia (ECLAC, 2004) and have evolved in response to 
changes in multilateral trade rules, regional trade agreements, and the peculiarities and 
constraints of the fiscal tax situation in particular countries.  Tables 1 and 2 summarize fiscal 
incentives in a sample of South American countries, and in Mexico, Central America, and a 
sample of Caribbean countries, respectively. 
  20Table 1. Summary of Fiscal Export Incentives in Selected South American Countries, March 2004 
 
  Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Ecuador  Peru  Uruguay  Vene- 
zuela 
Re-
bates 
Refund of 
indirect taxes 
(manufacturing, 
turnkey plants 
and exports 
from some 
regions) (1991) 
Drawback 
certificate DS 
21660 
(until 1991) 
No  Levels similar 
to tariffs 
Tax rebate 
certificate 
(CERT), Law 
48 of 1983. 
Replaced the 
CAT. Repealed 
in 2002 
No 
Refund of 
taxes paid 
following 
export 
Yes Yes 
Tax 
credit 
certif-
icates 
No 
Negotiable 
letter of credit 
certificate 
(CENOCREN) 
DS 21530 
No No 
Tax credit 
certificate 
(CAT) Decree-
Law 444 of 
1967 (repealed) 
Tax credit 
certificate 
(CAT). 
Agricultural 
Development 
Act (repealed) 
Tax credit 
(tax refund)  Yes  Special tax 
rebate* 
Draw-
backs 
Refund of 
import taxes 
and charges 
(1960) 
Refund of 
duties on 
imported inputs 
incorporated 
into exports 
(1991) 
Refund of 
import taxes 
and charges 
(1964) 
Refund of 
import  taxes 
and charges 
(1988) 
Duty drawback 
Vallejo Plan, 
created by DL 
444/67 (until 
end of 2004) 
Yes Yes 
Temporary 
admission 
mechanism 
with tariff 
exemption  
Yes 
Ex- 
emp-
tion 
from 
value 
added 
tax 
Includes credit 
for pre-export 
stages 
Tax refund 
certificate 
(CEDEIM) 
Law 1489 
(16/04/1993) 
Constitutional 
law since 1965  No No 
Yes (oil 
companies). 
Under 
government 
review 
Tax credit 
(VAT). D.S. 
No. 126 
(1994) 
Tax refund 
mechanism  No 
Ex-
emp-
tion 
from 
other 
indi- 
rect 
taxes 
Includes 
indirect 
exporters 
No No No No No No  Tax refund 
mechanism  No 
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  Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Ecuador  Peru  Uruguay  Vene- 
zuela 
Exemp-
tion from 
profit tax 
No No No No 
Full exemption 
in industrial 
free trade zone 
No 
Full exemption 
in industrial 
free trade zone 
No 
Full 
exemption 
in industrial 
free trade 
zone 
Per-
form-
ance-
based 
export 
incent-
ives 
Industrial 
specialization 
regime (1993-
1996), 
compensation 
for the 
automotive 
sector (1991) 
No 
Existed 
between 1972 
and 1990 
Simplified 
rebate (1985)  No No 
Simplified 
rebate for ex 
ante 
recognition of 
drawback, 
based on 
guarantee 
invoice 
No No 
Incent-
ive for 
trading 
compa-
nies 
No No  Existed until 
1990  No  No No No No  No 
Maquila/ 
free 
trade/ 
export 
process-
sing 
zones 
Yes 
Yes (industrial 
free trade zone) 
DS 21660 
16/04/1993. 
Temporary 
import regime 
for re-export 
(RITEX) 
Yes (1967)  Yes (1974)  Yes (textile 
sector) 
Yes 
Law No. 90 
(3/08/1990) 
Yes, Tacna free 
trade zone and 
CETICOS 
(industrial and 
commercial 
free zones). For 
firms that 
export 92% of 
their output. 
Yes Yes 
Defer-
red  
payment 
of 
customsd
uties 
No No No  For capital 
goods  No No No No  No 
Source: ECLAC (2004). 
*Until the mid-1990s, special tax rebate certificate for non-traditional agricultural exports depending on domestic value added (export bonds). D.881/75 (1992). 
 
  22Table 2. Summary of Fiscal Export Incentives in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, March 2004 
 
  Mexico  Guatemala  El Salvador  Honduras  Nicaragua  Costa Rica  Jamaica 
Other 
Caribbean 
Countries 
(d) 
Rebates No 
Refund of 
customs 
duties++ on 
imports and 
VAT (1989) 
Refund of 
import taxes and 
other indirect 
taxes.+++ 
Refund of tax 
credit to 
exporters (Art. 
77, VAT Law) 
Sales tax paid on 
purchase of 
inputs is 
converted into a 
tax credit for the 
firm (sales tax 
law) 
Tax refund 
of 1.5% of 
the value of 
exported 
goods 
No … No 
Tax credit 
certificates  No No No No  Existed until 
1997 
Existed until 
1997  … No 
Exemption from 
value added tax 
Includes pre-
export stages 
(1985) 
Total added 
component 
export regime 
Yes (with a zero 
rate) 
Yes (1998), 
sales tax  Yes (1991)  Yes (1972)  Yes  Yes 
Exemption from 
other indirect taxes 
Yes, for non-
NAFTA 
members. Bill 
on strategic 
zones submitted 
to congress in 
December in 
2002 
Total added 
component 
export regime 
Yes  Yes (1998)  Yes (1991)  Yes (1972)  Yes  Yes 
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  Mexico  Guatemala  El Salvador  Honduras  Nicaragua  Costa Rica  Jamaica 
Other 
Caribbean 
Countries 
(d) 
Exemption 
 from profit tax 
Yes, for non-
NAFTA 
members. Bill 
on strategic 
zones submitted 
to Congress in 
December 2002 
For exports to 
countries outside 
Central America 
For free trade 
zones  Yes (1998)  Yes (1992)  Existed until 
1996  … 
Grenada,  
St Lucia,  
St Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines, 
Guyana 
Export 
performance-
based incentives 
Program for 
export-oriented 
firms (ALTEX) 
No No No  No  No  …  Guyana and 
OECS 
Incentives for 
trading 
companies 
VAT exemption 
(1997) 
Waiver of taxes, 
customs duties 
and charges 
No No  No  No  …  No 
Maquila/free 
trade/export 
processing zones 
Various regions 
with maquila 
enterprises 
(1965) 
Yes (1989) 
Yes (1974). 
Reformed in 
1998 
Yes (1976)  Yes (1991)  Yes (1981)  …  No 
Source: ECLAC (2004)  
*For non-NAFTA countries 
++Only under the duty rebate regime; otherwise, firms have a waiver or suspension of payment. 
+++Refunds only amount to 6 percent of FOB value. (d) Includes Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
 
  24Financial Incentives.  Tables 3 and 4 summarize the existing financial export incentives 
in nine South American countries (as of March 2004), and in Mexico, the Central American 
countries and some Caribbean countries, respectively.  From the institutional point of view, four 
countries have public banks whose specific mission is to finance domestic exporters.  These are 
Colombia with BANCOLDEX, Jamaica with the National Export-Import Bank of Jamaica, 
Mexico with BANCOMEXT, and Venezuela with BANCOEX.  In Argentina, the Investment 
and Foreign Trade Bank (known by the Spanish acronym BICE) is a similar type of bank since it 
provides credit for both productive investment and exports.   Four countries provide financing 
through their main public development banks: Brazil (BNDES), Chile (Corporación de Fomento 
de la Producción, CORFO), Ecuador (National Finance Corporation, CFN), and Uruguay 
(Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay).  Out of the sample of 18 countries considered in 
Tables 3 and 4, only nine countries have government institutions that provide credit to exporters.  
In the remaining nine countries export finance is left to private commercial banks.  These include 
two South American countries (Bolivia and Peru), the five Central American countries, and two 
Caribbean countries (Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago).  In the case of Central America, 
governments prefer to support exports with fiscal rather than financial incentives (ECLAC, 
2004). 
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Table 3. Summary of Financial Export Incentives in Selected South American Countries 
  Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Ecuador  Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela 
Pre-  
and post-
shipment 
credit 
Lines of credit from 
the Bank for 
Investment and 
Foreign Trade 
(BICE) and 
commercial banks 
No From  the 
National Bank 
for Economic 
and Social 
Development 
(BNDES) and 
the Export-
Import Bank 
(EXIMBANK), 
for selected 
products 
Financing of 
national inputs 
for exporters 
(Production 
Development 
Corporation 
(CORFO))  
Line of credit 
from the 
Colombian 
Foreign Trade 
Bank 
(BANCOLDEX
) through 
commercial 
banks 
Private banks and 
credit from 
EXIMBANK 
through the 
National Finance 
Corporation (CFN) 
Private 
banks 
Line of credit 
from the Banco 
de la República 
Oriental de 
Uruguay 
(BROU) (1969) 
BICE lines 
of credit 
through 
commercial 
banks 
Post-
shipment 
credit 
Lines of credit from 
BICE and 
commercial banks 
No  Funds from the 
Export 
Financing 
Program 
(PROEX) for 
selected 
products 
Financing for 
consumer 
durable 
purchasers 
(CORFO) 
Line of credit 
from 
BANCOLDEX 
through 
commercial 
banks 
Private banks  Private 
banks 
Line of credit 
from BROU 
(1979) 
Line of 
credit from 
the Foreign 
Trade Bank 
(BANCOE
X)through 
commercial 
banks 
Trade 
promotion 
Banco de la Nación  Own funds 
as 
counterpart 
to ADC, 
IDB, World 
Bank and 
other 
projects 
Funds from 
BNDES and 
EXIMBANK 
Financing of the 
costs of 
marketing 
abroad 
(CORFO) 
Transport 
subsidy from the 
Export 
Promotion 
Office 
(PROEXPORT) 
(abolished in 
2002) 
COERPEl* 
Guayaquil 
Chamber of 
Commerce* 
Own funds; 
Peruvian 
Export 
Promotion 
Commis-
sion 
(PROM-
PEX) 
Line of credit 
from BROU 
(1969) 
BANCOEX
* 
Fixed asset 
financing for 
exporters 
No No  BNDES 
(20002), for 
locally-owned 
firms located 
abroad 
Advance VAT 
refunds for 
export 
investment 
projects 
Lines of credit 
from 
BANCOLDEX 
through 
commercial 
banks 
Private banks and 
credit from 
EXIMBANK 
through CFN 
Private 
banks; 
Guarantee 
Fund for 
Small 
Industry 
(FOGAPI) 
Lines of credit 
from BROU 
(1969) 
Lines of 
credit from 
BANCOEX 
through 
commercial 
banks 
  26Table 3., continued 
  Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Ecuador  Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela 
Financing for 
development 
of exportable 
products 
No No  For  SMEs 
(APEX) (1997) 
CORFO line of 
credit 
Lines of credit 
from 
BANCOLDEX 
through 
commercial 
banks 
Credit from the US 
Trade and 
Development 
Agency (TDA) 
and World Bank-
CORPEI for pilot 
project studies 
No No  Lines  of 
credit from 
BANCOEX 
through 
commercial 
banks 
Pre-shipment 
credit 
insurance 
Private insurers  No  YES  Private insurers  Private insurers  No  Private 
insurers, 
insurance 
for 
exporters 
(SEPIMEX)
/Developme
nt Finance 
Corporation 
(COFIDE)+
++ 
No Private 
insurers 
Post-
shipment 
credit 
insurance 
BICE and private 
insurers 
No Mixed  capital 
(public-private) 
insurer (1997) 
Private insurers  Private insurers  No  Private 
insurers 
No Private 
insurers 
Guarantee 
fund for 
exporters 
No No  Guarantee  fund 
to promote 
competitiveness 
(1997) 
Guarantee fund 
for exporters of 
non-traditional 
goods (1987) 
No No  No  No No 
Coverage of 
bank loans to 
exporters 
BICE No  Guarantee  fund 
for exports 
(BNDES) 
Coverage of 
bank loans 
(COBEX) 
No No  No  No No 
Financing for 
export-
oriented 
SMEs 
PYMEXPORTA 
(export program for 
SMEs), BICE and 
commercial banks 
No  No No No No  (SEPIMEX/
CPFIDE)* 
No No 
Source: ECLAC (2004). 
*Partial subsidy for participation in overseas events, trade fairs and missions. ++ Part-time export manager program (GTP).  
+++ Credit insurance fund for exporters (SEPIMEX), allocated US$50 million by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, covers 50% of the value of pre-shipment credit lines 
granted by private banks. Fund administered by the Peruvian Development Finance Corporation (COFIDE).  
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  Mexico  Guatemala  El Salvador  Honduras  Nicaragua  Costa Rica  Jamaica  Other 
Caribbean 
Countries++ 
Pre-shipment 
credit 
National Foreign Trade 
Bank (BANCOMEXT) 
for manufacturing 
products (1988) 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
No 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
National  
Export-Import 
Bank 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
EXIMBANK++
+ 
Post-shipment 
credit 
BANCOMEXT funds 
(1985) 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
No 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
National 
Export-Import 
Bank 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
EXIMBANK++
+ 
Trade 
promotion 
BANCOMEXT 
 funds 
(1985) 
No  No No No  No 
Jamaica 
Investment 
and Export 
Promotions 
Agency 
(JAMPRO) 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
(TIDGO), 
Barbados 
Investment and 
Development 
Corporation 
Fixed asset 
financing for 
exporters 
BANCOMEXT 
 resources 
(1985) 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
No 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
… … 
Financing for 
development 
of exportable 
products 
BANCOMEXT 
 resources 
(1985) 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
Private 
commercial 
banks* and 
state 
support 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
… … 
Pre-shipment 
credit 
insurance 
BANCOMEXT Private  insurers  Private 
insurers 
Private 
insurers 
Private 
insurers 
Private 
insurers 
National 
Export-Import 
Bank 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
EXIMBANK++
+ 
Post-shipment 
credit 
insurance 
BANCOMEXT Private  insurers  Private 
insurers 
Private 
insurers 
Private 
insurers 
Private 
insurers 
National 
Export-Import 
Bank 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
EXIMBANK++
+ 
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  Mexico  Guatemala  El Salvador  Honduras  Nicaragua  Costa Rica  Jamaica  Other 
Caribbean 
Countries++ 
Guarantee 
fund for 
exporters 
BANCOMEXT  No  No No No  No 
National 
Export-Import 
Bank 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
EXIMBANK++
+ 
Coverage of 
bank loans to 
exporters 
BANCOMEXT  No  No No No  No  No  No 
Financing for 
export-
oriented 
SMEs 
Mexican export 
program 
(BANCOMEXT) 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
Export 
development 
fund 
Technical 
assistance 
fund for 
exporters 
Wholesale 
banking 
system: 
Central 
American 
Bank for 
Economic 
Integration 
(CABEI), 
Banco 
Grupo el 
Ahorro 
Hondureño 
(BGA), 
FICOHSA, 
Covelo 
Foundation
, Honduran 
Private 
Enterprise 
Council 
(COHEP) 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
Private 
commercial 
banks* 
No No 
Source: ECLAC (2004). 
* In all the Central American countries, private commercial banks play a major role in foreign trade activities, both through their own funds and through the 
management of lines of credit granted by international institutions such as the Central American Bank for Economic Integration or the Latin American Export Bank 
(BLADEX), which also extend loans to private banks in other countries in the region. However, in some countries, such as Honduras, the private banking system is 
not fully exploited. 
++  Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. 
+++Also financed by the Regional Caribbean Exports agency. 
  29Export Processing Zones.  An Export Processing Zone (EPZ) is an arrangement in which 
exporting firms locate their manufacturing plants in a common in-bond physical space and 
receive a set of fiscal incentives in exchange for the commitment to produce and/or process 
goods for the external market.
9  In his survey of industrial policies, Melo (2001) found that 20 
countries offer the EPZ option to both foreign investors and domestic exporters, making this the 
most widely used fiscal-incentive vehicle. 
Incentives for Trade in Services.  According to ECLAC (2004), the main fiscal 
incentives for promotion of merchandise exports can also be applied to service exports.  These 
incentives include: (i) the drawback mechanism applied in Argentina, Chile, and the Dominican 
Republic; (ii) refund of indirect taxes in Mexico; (iii) access to export processing zones in Chile; 
(iv) deferred payment of tariffs on capital goods imports in Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay; and (v) 
tax exemptions for tourism services in Chile and Peru.  Financial mechanisms to support trade in 
services include: (i) credit for acquisition of domestic services by foreign buyers (Brazil and 
Chile); (ii) financing of investments abroad (Central America); (iii) export insurance; and (iv) 
credit for the development and dissemination of new services (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico).     
Access and Penetration into Foreign Markets.  One of the characteristic developments 
of the post-import-substitution period from the standpoint of both policy and institutional 
transformations in the public sector is the emphasis on foreign market access and penetration.  
While trade negotiations are a key front in the battle that Latin American and Caribbean 
countries have waged to gain access to foreign markets for their goods and services, particularly 
in developed countries, these policy initiatives will not be discussed in this paper as they cannot 
be considered as productive development policies in the proper sense of the term.  The 
discussion will instead concentrate on policy and institutional initiatives that do not depend on 
the success of international trade negotiations.   
                                                 
9 Tax incentives for locating in these zones usually offer the following exemptions: (i) corporate income taxes for up 
to 20 years; (ii) taxes on dividends and profits; (iii) import and export duties on capital equipment, intermediate 
goods, and spare parts; (iv) sales, excise, and consumption taxes; (v) taxes on transfers of profits; (vi) restrictions on 
foreign exchange; and (vii) industrial regulations applying elsewhere in the country.  In addition to these incentives, 
firms in export processing zones usually benefit from simplified and expedited export procedures (such as customs 
inspection in the zone); strategic location (e.g., proximity to ports, airports, or key roads); a modern physical 
infrastructure in the zone (warehouses, roads, power plants, etc.); and complementarities and economies of scale in 
the use of services such as security and employee transportation. 
  30The substance of the support provided to private exporters consists mostly of systematization and 
provision of trade information, organization of exporters’ participation in trade fairs and 
missions, and basic export training courses.          
As suggested above, the institutional aspect of the non-financial support to exporters is 
interesting.  There is some measure of experimentation and institutional diversity in the way 
different countries respond to the market penetration needs of their exporters.  Table 5 shows, for 
a sample of 25 Latin American and Caribbean countries, the agencies responsible for non-
financial export promotion; the legal nature of these agencies, whether they are fully public, 
mixed public-private or fully private agencies; and the information on whether the agency is 
responsible for both export and foreign investment promotion or only export promotion. 
 
Table 5. Export Promotion Agencies in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Country  Agency  Legal nature  Mission 
Argentina   Banco de Inversión y Comercio Exterior  (BICE)  Public  Only X 
Bahamas  No export promotion agency  N/A  N/A 
Barbados   Barbados Investment and Development Corporation (BIDC)   Public  X + INV 
Belize  Belize Trade & Investment Development Service (BELTRAIDE)   Public  X + INV 
Bolivia  Centro de Promoción Bolivia (CEPROBOL) under the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs  
Public  X + INV 
Brazil  Agência de Promoçao de Exportaçoes  Public Only  X 
Chile ProChile  Public  Only  X 
Colombia  PROEXPORT  Public  X + INV 
Dominican 
Republic 
Centro de Exportación e Inversiones de la Republica Dominicana   Public   X + INV 
Ecuador  Corporación de Promoción de Exportaciones e Inversiones   Public-private  X + INV 
El Salvador  Fondo de Fomento a las Exportaciones (FOEX) under the Ministry 
of the Economy   
Public Only  X 
Guatemala   Cámara de Industrias de Guatemala   Fully Private  Only X 
Guyana  Guyana Office for Investment (GO-Invest)  Public  X + INV 
Haiti  No export promotion agency  N/A  N/A 
Honduras  Dirección General de Promoción del Comercio Exterior under the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce    
Public Only  X 
Jamaica  Jamaica Promotion Corporation (JAMPRO)   Public  X + INV 
Mexico  Banco de Comercio Exterior de México   Public  X + INV 
Nicaragua  Centro de Promoción de Exportaciones (NICAEXPORT)   Public-private   Only X 
Panama   Viceministerio de Comercio Exterior under the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry  
Public Only  X 
Paraguay   No export promotion agency  N/A  N/A 
Peru  Comisión para la Promoción de Exportaciones (PROMPEX)  Public  Only X 
Suriname  No export promotion agency  N/A  N/A 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Tourism and Industrial Development Corporation of Trinidad & 
Tobago (TIDCO) 
Public   X + INV 
Uruguay  Instituto de Promoción de Inversiones y de Exportaciones de 
Bienes y Servicios (Uruguay XXI)  
Public  X + INV 
Venezuela   Banco de Comercio Exterior   Public Only  X 
Note: “Only X” means that the agency is only concerned with export promotion.  “X + INV” means that the agency covers both 
export and investment promotion. 
  313.3.2  Export Promotion: Towards an Assessment of Effectiveness  
 
From the standpoint of effectiveness, a constraining factor for export promotion policies is that 
very few countries in the region have the complete battery of policies required to do an effective 
job of export promotion.  A complete policy menu would cover the entire range of activities 
from the production stage to the marketing of products in the target markets and should include 
credit services and/or fiscal incentives, credit insurance, trade information, training, facilitation 
of access to foreign markets, improvement of quality standards, assistance with issues of 
distribution logistics, business intelligence, and trade diplomacy.  In a considerable number of 
countries, the governments only provide a part of these incentives or services.  For instance, as 
mentioned above, in a sample of 18 countries of the region, in only nine countries do government 
institutions provide credit to exporters.  In the other nine, export finance is left to private 
commercial banks.  In four countries there is no export promotion agency of any kind, not even 
for the simplest promotional tasks.  
Another related constraining factor is the fact that in some countries the institutional 
framework for export promotion is not sufficiently developed.  Although a single institution is 
not absolutely necessary for effective export promotion, the minimum requirement is a small 
network of solid institutions with stable financing, qualified professional staffs, and careful 
coordination.  This is not, by any means, the general pattern in the region.  In some cases, the 
existing institutions are not only poorly coordinated but also work at cross-purposes.  For 
instance, in some countries, export promotion efforts are hindered by institutional rivalries 
between the foreign offices of the export promotion institutions and the network of embassies 
and consulates.      
An even more serious constraining factor—which we will return to at the end of the 
paper, since it affects not only export promotion polices but all productive development 
policies—is the chronic budgetary constraint characteristic of public sectors in countries with 
low tax-to-GDP ratios, constraints that worsen when fiscal adjustments are undertaken.     
However, on the positive side, most Latin American countries have made their diplomatic 
offices and/or the foreign offices of their export promotion institutions into increasingly effective 
tools in facilitating access by domestic exporters to foreign markets and in providing information 
on the country’s export supply to prospective buyers in the target markets.   
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industrial policy is relevant for the analysis of current export promotion policies in the region 
since some countries have National Export Strategies or National Export Plans where sectors are 
selected as special targets for promotion.  Venezuela’s current National Export Strategy, where 
the policy instruments for promoting exports are also seen as tools to induce transformations in 
the production structure, is a case in point.  However, it must also be pointed out that it is not in the 
area of export promotion policies where the distinction between the two approaches is most visible, 
because it is in the nature of export promotion that horizontal policies must prevail in its design.             
 
3.4 Policies to Promote Innovation, Higher Productivity and Competitiveness 
 
The second broad class of productive development policies to be surveyed here includes all 
policies (other than export-promotion policies) whose aim is to foster higher productivity, greater 
efficiency, technological innovation, and stronger competitiveness (i.e., the capacity to produce 
goods of a given quality at a lower cost or goods of higher quality, given the cost).   This policy 
set is discussed here under three main headings: (1) policies to promote innovation and 
technological development; (2) policies to foster the integration and strengthening of production 
networks; and (3) policies to extend and deepen the use of information and communication 
technologies. 
It is in this area where the distinction between the strategy-driven and demand-driven 
approaches is most relevant and can bear more fruit from the analytical standpoint.  By its nature 
the goal of improved competitiveness raises the issue of whether the country in question (or 
perhaps, to be more precise, its entrepreneurial class and/or its technical intelligentsia and 
policymaking elite) is satisfied with its place in the international division of labor.  As will be 
seen shortly, some countries are attempting actively and explicitly attempting to change their 
linkages to the international economy and see innovation and competitiveness policies as a 
means of getting where they want to be.             
 
3.4.1 Policies and Institutions to Promote Innovation and Technological Development 
 
The discussion starts with a review of the changes in the institutional aspect of science and 
technology policies in the last few decades and then examines the array of government 
interventions aimed at promoting technological innovation and development. 
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transformations in concepts and institutions have occurred over the last few decades.  As stated 
by ECLAC (2002), in the import-substitution era the public sector played a fundamental role in 
providing direct and indirect support for the development of technological capabilities.  One way 
in which this was done was to create an institutional infrastructure for science and technology, 
which consisted of two key components.  The first was to set up independent, decentralized 
public agencies—the national science and technological councils—which were given 
responsibility for science and technology policymaking and promotion of scientific research and 
technological development.  The second, which largely pre-dated the national councils, consisted 
of an array of public research institutes and laboratories, located both inside and outside public 
universities.  The region’s largest countries took the lead in implementing this institutional 
infrastructure.  The National Institute for Scientific Research (INIC) was created in Mexico in 
1950;
10 the National Research Council (CNPq) in Brazil in 1951, and Argentina’s National 
Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET) in 1958.  In addition, technology 
institutes in areas such as agriculture, energy (including nuclear energy), industrial technology, 
mining, forestry, and aeronautics were also established.
11     
The basic concept behind this institutional infrastructure was the idea that the state’s only 
role was to organize and subsidize the supply of scientific knowledge and technological know-
how as public goods.  It was believed that solving the bottleneck on the supply side would lead 
almost automatically to the adoption of technologies by the enterprises on the demand side.
12   
As soon as this model was relatively consolidated the first signs started to appear that 
something was wrong with this model.  The policy design led to a situation where the 
technological research carried out in the public research institutes did not, for the most part, 
address the needs of the production sectors.  In the early 1970s, a growing awareness of the need 
to create effective demand for science and technology led policymakers to adopt a more selective 
and sector-specific approach.  This brought about the organizational reforms of the mid-1970s.  
                                                 
10 In 1970, INIC was replaced by the National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT). 
11 For instance, Argentina’s National Atomic Energy Commission was set up in 1954, followed in 1957 by the 
National Institute of Industrial Technology, and the National Institute of Agricultural Technology (ECLAC, 2004).  
In Mexico, the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) was created in 1956, the Mexican Petroleum Institute 
in 1965, the Electricity Research Institute in 1975, and the Mexican Institute for Water Technology in 1986.  
12 This way of conceiving the relationship between science and technology, on one hand, and their productive 
applications by firms, on the other, is known as the linear supply model.  See the discussions in ECLAC (2002, 
2004). 
  34The main action was the formal creation of “national S&T systems” from above by simply 
bringing together all organizations, institutes, agencies, societies, and individuals directly 
involved in scientific and technological activities under the direction of the S&T policy agencies.  
These agencies were, in turn, given the responsibility for articulating, planning, and coordinating 
the whole “system.” 
The economic crises and stabilization programs of the 1980s hit the S&T agencies hard.  
Fiscal adjustments led to budgetary contraction and, in some cases, the agencies were affected by 
the downsizing of the public administration.  In addition, some policies containing strong 
elements of interventionism (or perceived as such) were scaled down.  In the meantime, public 
support for basic scientific research and graduate training inside and outside the region continued 
to absorb most of the public budget earmarked for S&T activities. 
Throughout this process, the central organizational feature of the policy agencies was a 
fairly high degree of centralization of decision-making.  Other shortcomings have been 
frequently highlighted.  Writing about Argentina’s case, for instance, Chudnovsky (1999) 
pointed to “a lack of priorities, serious shortcomings in management, lack of coordination and of 
quality evaluation mechanisms, and serious imbalances in budgetary allocations” (p. 165).  Other 
analysts pointed to the lack of an appropriate legal and institutional framework, which kept 
public authorities, including the S&T agencies, in a situation of isolation and lack of 
accountability.  These authors have established, for some key countries, a connection between 
these institutional features and the experience of authoritarian political regimes.  Instead of 
creating favorable conditions for state efficiency, insulation and lack of accountability promote 
policy rigidity and increase the likelihood of capture by private groups  (Bastos, 1995). 
The institutional situation in the smaller and/or poorer countries was even worse.  While 
there were a few good R&D institutions, often organized on a sub-regional basis, most of these 
countries had almost no institutional base, except for a few universities. 
In the 1990s, the supply-based model finally broke down and was replaced in a number 
of countries, by a new approach emphasizing demand-side incentives (ECLAC, 2004).  In this 
approach, priority has been given to the design and utilization of instruments to promote demand 
for technological innovation and support the transfer of technological know-how to the firms in 
the production sectors.  Demand subsidies play an important role in this model, and the way they 
are allocated makes technology policies more horizontal and neutral. 
  35The new approach was accompanied by institutional reform. The main components of the 
reform were (1) greater legal formalization of the national science and technology system; (ii) 
the introduction of separate funding programs (or even agencies) for technological 
modernization, clearly differentiated from the traditional programs (or agencies) responsible for 
funding scientific research; (iii) implementation of a more participatory approach, which 
strengthened the role of the business sector and the dialogue with it; (iv) separation of the 
policymaking function from the programming, promotion, execution, and evaluation functions, 
and the assignment of responsibility for the two sets of functions to different government 
agencies. 
A conceptual and intellectual change that made a major contribution to creating and 
shaping the climate for reform was the increasing acceptance in the region of the systemic 
concept of productive innovation as a social practice conducted by a wide variety of actors.  
Most S&T policy elites in the region adopted the conceptual tools of the national innovation 
systems approach and applied them to strategic, institutional and policy issues.  A number of 
countries have formally incorporated the systemic concept into the legal reforms of the 1990s, as 
will be seen shortly. 
The wind of reform blew in most of countries in the region.  To illustrate the extent of the 
legal-institutional transformation in the 1990s, it is appropriate to mention some of the legal 
milestones in this process.  These took the form of laws that reformed the pre-existing science 
and technology agencies (or created them where they did not previously exist), created 
instruments to promote scientific research and technological innovation, and gave legal status to 
the national innovation or national science and technology systems.
13  One important 
                                                 
13 By country in alphabetical order, the main legal changes in the 1990s were as follows.  In Argentina, the Law for 
the Promotion of Technological Innovation was passed in 1990; in 1996, the Technological and Scientific Cabinet 
and the National Agency for the Promotion of Science and Technology were created.  In Brazil, the National 
Council for Science and Technology (CCT), an advisory body, was created in 1996.  In Bolivia, in 1991, the 
government issued Supreme Decree 22908 to regulate science, technology and innovation activities, and in 2000 the 
Senate passed the Law for the Promotion of Science, Technology, and Innovation.  In Colombia, in 1990, Congress 
gave legal status to the National System of Science and Technology; and in 1995 the National Innovation System 
was legally created.  In Ecuador, in 1994, the new institutional framework was established by Executive Decree 
1603, which reorganized the National System of Science and Technology, and Decree 1605, which created the 
Science and Technology Foundation.  In 1992, the National Council of Science and Technology was set up.  In 
Guatemala the Law for the Promotion of Science and Technology was passed in 1991.  The Honduran Council of 
Science and Technology was created in 1992 and the Nicaraguan Council of Science and Technology in 1995.  The 
Law that regulates science and technology activities was passed in 1997 by the Panamanian legislature.  In 
Paraguay, Law 1028 of 1997 established the National System of Science and Technology.  In Uruguay the 
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Latin American countries, namely Brazil, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. 
New management practices were (and are still being) introduced to strengthen the 
planning of activities, the coordination of organizations and efforts, and the evaluation of results.  
One of these practices is the drafting, participatory discussion, and formal approval of multi-
annual strategic plans.  These plans typically define the conceptual framework, objectives, 
strategies, policies, priorities, intermediate goals, guidelines, action programs, and quantitative 
targets for governments and their agencies.  They also evaluate the system’s accomplishments in 
previous years and diagnose the policy challenges that need to be addressed. 
The Technology Funds.  The most important public-policy instrument to support 
technological innovation evolved by countries in the region is the technology fund. Technology 
funds provide loans, subsidies or grants to firms undertaking technological innovation and 
modernization.   This is also the instrument par excellence for drawing a clear line between the 
strategy-driven and the demand-driven approaches.  The Brazilian scheme of sector-oriented 
funds is a clear example of a long-term policy aimed at selectively strengthening a particular set 
of productive sectors.  The 14 Brazilian funds are designed to promote R&D in the natural gas, 
information technology, water resources, energy, agribusiness, infrastructure, mining, land 
transportation, space, telecommunications, health, biotechnology, and aviation sectors, as well as 
technological cooperation between university research centers and enterprises.
14  The Brazilian 
sector funds are typically financed from revenue from the sector enterprises.  For firms in these 
sectors, the laws setting up the individual sector funds define the share of company income to be 
set aside for R&D activities (ECLAC, 2004).  Table 6 shows the characteristics of seven of the 
Brazilian sector funds. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Institutional System of Science of Technology was reformed in 1999 in the context of a general reform of the 
Uruguayan state.  Also in 1999 the Ministry of Science and Technology was set up in Venezuela. 
14 The fund concerned with this is the Verde e Amarelho Fund. 
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Sector funds  Objectives  Origin of financial resources  Activities 
CT-PETRO (1999) Sector 
fund for the oil and natural 
gas sector. Established by 
Law No. 9487 of 1997. 
Sector development 
through promotion 
R&D and human 
resources training 
25% of value of royalties 
exceeding 5% of production of oil 
and natural gas 
Collaboration in the definition of policies 
and implementation of specific programs. In 
2001, 144 projects worth 7 million reales 
were approved by the CNPq. Expenditure 
between January and November 2003: 
16,431,002.70 reales  
CT-ENERG  
Sector fund for the energy 
sector. Establishing 
instrument: Law No. 9991 
of 2000 
Sector development 
through promotion of 
R&D 
Between 0.75% and 1% of the net 
income of enterprises with 
concessions for the generation, 
transmission and distribution of 
electricity 
In 2001 the CNPq approved 132 R&D 
projects involving the investment of 8 
million reales by the fund.  In 2001 an 
association agreement was signed between 
the National Electric Power Agency and the 
CNPq to promote cooperation between 
research centers and enterprises. Total 
expenditure between January and 
November 2003: 8,397,983.70 
CT-HYDRO 
Sector fund for water 
resources. Establishing 
instrument: Law No. 9993 
of 2000 
Reduction of disparities 
between regions 
through investments in 
science and technology 
activities of importance 
for the sector. 
Strengthening of water 
resource sustainability. 
4% of the financial revenue of 
electricity generation enterprises 
Financing of scientific and technological 
development projects and programs 
designed to improve water quality and use. 
In 2002, 28.6 million reales were invested, 
of which at least 4 million were for training 
specialized personnel. Expenditure between 
January and November 2003: 3,735,635.85 
reales 
CT-INFO  
Sector fund for 
information technology. 
Establishing instrument: 
Law No. 10176 of 2001 
Promotion of 
competitiveness 
through R&D programs 
and projects 
At least 5% of the gross annual 
sales in the domestic 1T-related 
goods and services market of 
enterprises producing goods and 
services related to IT which 
receive tax incentives under the 
law to promote the IT industry  
It is estimated that over 50 million reales 
are spent each year on promotion of R&D 
activities in this sector. Expenditure 
between January and November 2003 was 
9,917,983.70 reales 
Sector fund for 
agribusiness. Establishing 
instrument: Law No. 
10332 of 2001 
Strengthening of 
competitive position of 
products of this sector 
on international markets 
Law No. 10168 of 2000 
establishes the sources of 
financing for this fund, which 
receives 17.5% of the amount 
covered by the law.  
Financing of R&D and science and 
technology activities. Expenditure between 
January and November 2003: 2,140,277.92 
reales 
FVA 
“Green and Yellow fund.” 
Establishing instrument: 
Law No. 10168 of 2000 
Promotion of 
technological 
cooperation among 
universities, research 
centers and enterprises 
Contributions in the form of 
royalties from enterprises holding 
user licenses or acquiring 
technological know-how abroad 
A minimum of 30% of the fund is 
earmarked for technological training and 
modernization in the Northern, 
Northwestern and Midwestern regions. 
Expenditure between January and 
November 2003: 58,071,768.19 reales 
CT-INFRA (2002) 
Infrastructure fund. 
Establishing instrument: 
Law No. 10197 of 2001 
Subsidies for 
maintenance and 
modernization of the 
technological 
infrastructure of public 
universities and 
research centers to 
improve the 
competitiveness of the 
productive sectors 
20% of the resources allocated to 
each sectoral fund from the 
National Technological 
Development Fund (FNDCT) and 
from the other funds for financing 
science and technology activities 
In 2002, 100 million reales were provided 
to create suitable conditions for activities in 
science and technology bodies. 
The Northern, Northwestern and 
Midwestern regions will receive at least 
30% of the amount. Expenditure between 
January and November 2003: 
70,284,331,.74 
*This table only includes the funds that spent more than 1,500,000 reales in 2003. The excluded funds were mining, land transport, the 
space sector, telecommunications, health, biotechnology and the aeronautical sector.  
Source: ECLAC (2004). 
 
  38On the other side of the divide, technology funds in most other countries are demand-
driven.  In a typical fund of this type, the public budget provides the funds, often as a counterpart 
to loans from the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, which have been very 
active on this front.  The funds are accessed through competition in line with a horizontal 
management approach (ECLAC, 2004).  The Chilean system of funds appropriately illustrates 
this demand-subsidy-based approach (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7. Funds to Support Science and Technology Activities in Chile 
Fund and 
administering body 
Objectives  Beneficiaries  Origin and destination 
of financial resources 
National Fund for 
Scientific and 
Technological 
Development 
(FONDECYT). 
Administered by 
CONICYT 
Promote the development of 
basic scientific and 
technological research in order 
to create or improve methods 
and means of production of 
goods and services 
Natural persons or research institutes 
using various financing programs 
Contributions allocated 
under the National 
Budget law, legacies, 
and domestic and 
international donations 
which do not have any 
other specific purpose. 
The beneficiaries are 
selected by public 
competition 
Fund for Promotion 
of Scientific and 
Technological 
Development 
(FONDET).  
Administered by 
CORFO 
Strengthen the scientific and 
technological capacity of 
universities and research 
centers in order to increase the 
competitiveness of enterprises.  
To finance projects in priority 
areas (natural resources, 
promising areas for the creation 
of value added, and others with 
high social impact) 
Not-for-profit institutions, individually or 
in association, which carry out R&D 
activities and have legally existed for at 
least 5 years. The fund requires the 
participation of enterprises, especially in 
the technology area.   
The fund finances up to 
60% of the cost of 
projects, with a ceiling 
of 450 million pesos. 
Institutions and 
enterprises must 
contribute at least 20%. 
The beneficiaries are 
selected by competition 
based on R&D projects, 
on an open-window 
basis for technology 
transfer projects 
Development and 
Innovation Fund 
(FDI). Administered 
by CORFO 
 
 
Improve technological 
innovation in areas with 
strategic impacts in terms of 
economic and social 
development.  
Not-for-profit institutions and technology 
centers engaged in R&D activities, 
technology transfer and related services. 
Technological-entrepreneurial consortia 
of at least 3 enterprises not ownership-
related before the date of application, 
associated with one or more technology 
centers. 
Project completions; 
tenders for the 
execution of specific 
lines of work; and open-
window arrangements 
(new form of 
allocation). The fund 
finances expenditure on 
operations, 
administration, human 
resources, subcontracts, 
and any other areas 
needed for the project. 
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Associate 
Development 
Projects (PROFOs). 
Administered by 
CORFO 
Improve the competitiveness of 
a group of enterprises aimed at 
solving management and 
marketing problems on a joint 
basis 
SMEs with annual sales of 2,400 to 
100,000 UF. Minimum sales are 1,200 
UF for agricultural enterprises, while 
maximum sales rise to 200,000 UF for 
manufacturing enterprises which are 
associated in groups of at least 5  
Open-window basis: the 
enterprises must contact 
CORFO intermediaries 
who will provide 
application forms and 
appoint professionals to 
diagnose the stage of 
preparation of the 
project 
Technical Assistance 
Fund (FAT). 
Administered by 
CORFO 
Introduce management 
techniques into the operations 
of enterprises or new 
technologies into their 
production processes through 
consultants 
Chilean companies which require 
specialized outside support and have net 
annual sales under 100,000 UF. The 
consultants are appointed on an 
individual basis (at least 3 companies in 
the latter case) 
Open-window basis 
(both cases): Individual 
FAT assistance: for the 
initial diagnosis, 
CORFO contributes 17 
UF and the enterprise 3 
UF, while CORFO 
subsequently finances 
up to 50% of the 
consultancy costs.  In 
the case of collective 
arrangements, CORFO 
finances up to 50% of 
the consultancy costs, 
with a maximum of 100 
UF per company 
National Fund for the 
Technological and 
Productive 
Development 
(FONTEC).  
Administered by 
CORFO 
Promote, guide, and sponsor, 
through 5 lines of assistance, 
projects in the areas of 
technological innovation, 
associative technology transfer, 
and implementation of 
technological infrastructure 
Lines 1, 2, 3 and 5 finance private 
enterprises producing goods and services 
which demonstrate the necessary 
technical, administrative and financial 
capacity and are not in payment arrears. 
They can apply individually or in 
association, provided in the latter case 
that they are not commercially linked. 
Line 4 finances enterprises producing 
goods and services in a single production 
sector, and are applying for assistance in 
tackling technological problems of an 
associative nature. 
Open-window basis: for 
lines 1, 2, 3, and 5, an 
application for the 
finance must be 
submitted to FONTEC 
or CORFO, which will 
consider the project in 
line with their rules for 
applications, together 
with information on the 
legal and financial 
status of the enterprises. 
 
Open-window basis: 
line 4 requires 
application for a 
diagnostic stage 
involving the 
preparation of a 
Relevance Analysis for 
FONTEC or CORFO 
Source: ECLAC (2004). 
 
 
Fiscal Incentives.  In a number of countries in the region, fiscal incentives for technology 
innovation are utilized as a policy instrument. They typically include: 1) reduction of corporate 
income tax; 2) reduction of VA taxes; 3) accelerated depreciation of capital goods and equipment 
acquired in the context of an innovation project; and 4) granting of tax credits on expenses and 
additional investments in R&D.  In addition to this basic set, some individual countries grant 
  40certain special incentives.  Colombia allows a 125 percent deduction of the costs of innovation 
projects carried out by firms, and grants exemption from VA taxes on imports of equipment and 
instruments for innovation projects by research centers, technological development institutes and 
the universities.  Brazil grants exemption from the Tax on Industrialized Products to firms 
producing information technology products provided that they spend more than 5 percent of their 
gross sales on R&D. It also allows the deduction as operational expenses of royalties and other 
technical assistance payments made by advanced-technology firms. 
 
3.4.2  Policies to Foster the Integration and Strengthening of Production Networks 
 
In discussing enterprise networks, two alternative classifications, from different standpoints, can 
help organize information on the varied array of policies adopted in the region.  The first 
classification distinguishes between production chains and clusters.  Production chains comprise 
firms that are linked through the successive transformations of inputs into final goods (e.g., the 
production chain that links cotton producers with textile producers and apparel manufacturers). 
These producers may or may not be geographically concentrated.  In contrast, clusters are 
defined as local concentrations of producers that benefit from economies of agglomeration, 
precisely because of their geographical concentration.  In clusters, producers generally (but not 
always) belong to different industries. 
The second classification is proposed by Dini (2002), who distinguishes among 
horizontal, vertical, and territorial networks.  Horizontal networks are cooperation schemes 
among small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  Vertical networks are formed by linkages 
between large enterprises and their suppliers (which are frequently SMEs).  Territorial networks 
are cooperation schemes between firms and other actors (local governments, universities, non-
governmental organizations, etc.) in local communities (towns, regions, districts, etc.) aimed at 
developing competitive advantages appropriable by the participating firms. 
The two alternative classifications will be used to draw an admittedly incomplete picture 
of support policies aimed at developing the potential collective efficiencies existing in the 
different type of entrepreneurial networks. 
Production Chains.   As an illustration, let us consider the sectors whose production 
chains are given priority by the Colombian, Mexican, and Honduran governments through an 
array of actions and instruments. Colombia targets the following production chains: cotton-
  41fibers-textile-apparel; electrical appliances industry; auto parts-automotive; agribusiness; the 
Vallenato culture cluster;
15 leather-footwear-leather-manufactures; electrical machinery and 
equipment and professional electronics; forestry-furniture-wood products; forestry-pulp-paper-
graphic-industry; metal-mechanic industry; petrochemicals; hygiene-cosmetics; vegetable-based 
natural products; engineering, consulting, and construction services; the health services industry; 
and the software industry (Colombia Compite, 2004).   
Mexico targets the production chains of six sectors: electronic and high technology 
industries; software industry; automotive industry; maquiladoras; leather and footwear industry; 
and the fiber-textile-apparel chain (Secretaría de Economía de México, 2004).   
Finally, Honduras identified the following production (or “value”) chains as having high 
potential: agribusiness and foodstuffs with high valued added; “differentiated” tourism; electric 
power generation; forestry-furniture; and textiles with high value added (Alonso, 2003).  
Cluster Promotion.   Interest in cluster promotion has multiplied in the last decade.  As 
ECLAC (2004) has pointed out, there are hundreds of cluster projects in Latin America, which 
makes reviewing what is being done in the region on this front nothing short of a daunting task.  
However, a reasonable approach is to rely on Dini’s (2002) survey of the main government 
programs that support the association of SMEs in clusters.  Dini lists the following programs: 
Faroles de Desenvolvimento y Polos de Desenvolvimento supported by Banco do Nordeste in 
Brazil; the Technological Platform Program of the Brazilian Ministry of Science and 
Technology; the Cluster Promotion Program in the Brazilian states of Minas Gerais, 
Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Sul; CORFO’s Programa Territorial Integrado and Proyectos 
Asociativos de Fomento (PROFO) in Chile; SECOFI’s Programa de Agrupamientos 
Empresariales in Mexico; the UNIDO Project in Nicaragua; El Salvador’s Cluster Program; and 
PROMPYME’s Cluster Program in Peru. 
Horizontal and Vertical Networks.   To the extent that the territorial networks examined 
by Dini (2004) are essentially the same as clusters, this short discussion of the policy initiatives 
to support production networks can be completed with Dini’s summary of the countries that have 
programs aimed at promoting horizontal and vertical networks. Table 8 provides this 
information. 
                                                 
15 The Vallenato culture cluster revolves around the production, recording, and export of the folk music of 
Colombia’s Caribbean coast. 
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Country  Horizontal Networks  Vertical Networks 
Argentina   x 
Brazil x  x 
Chile x  x 
Colombia x  x 
Costa Rica    x 
Ecuador x   
El Salvador  x   
Honduras x   
Mexico x  x 
Nicaragua x  x 
Peru x   
Uruguay x   
Source: Dini (2002).     
 
3.4.3  Policies to Extend and Deepen the Use of Information and Communication Technologies 
 
Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have been developing national strategies to 
expand and deepen the utilization of modern information and communication technologies 
(ICT).  Table 9 summarizes the most important features of those strategies in 12 countries of the 
region.  In terms of thematic priorities the deployment of a universal and modern ICT 
infrastructure; the reduction of the digital divide; the development of e-government; and ICT 
dissemination in the school system occupy center stage in the existing strategies (ECLAC, 2004). 
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  Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Ecuador 
Current Stage  Strategic Vision  Policy 
formulation 
Policy 
formulation 
Implementat
ion and 
monitoring 
Implementation 
and monitoring 
Strategic vision 
Principal 
coordinator in 
the current 
stage 
PSI, SGP and SeCyT 
www.psi.gov.ar
www.sgp.gov.ar
www.secyt.gov.ar 
Agency for the 
Development of 
the Information 
Society in 
Bolivia (ADSIB) 
www.adsib.gov.
bo  
Executive 
Committee on 
Electronic 
Government 
Digital 
Action 
Group 
www.econo
mia.cl
Connectivity 
Agenda 
www.agenda.go
v.co
National 
Connectivity 
Commission 
www.connectivid
ad.gov.ec 
Guideline 
Document 
Strategic: NO 
Operational: NO 
Strategic: YES 
Operational: NO 
Strategic: YES 
Operational: 
NO 
Strategic: 
YES 
Operational: 
YES 
Strategic: YES 
Operational: 
YES 
Strategic: NO 
Operational: NO 
Launch Date  March 2000  March 2002  December 
1999 
July 1998  February 2000  August 2001 
Decree  Decree 1018/98, 
amended by Decrees 
252/00 and 243/01 
Supreme Decree 
26553, March 
2002 
Decree 3294, 
December 
1999 
Supreme 
Decree of 
July 1, 1998 
and Decree 
of June 2000 
CONPES 3072 
February 2000 
Executive Decree 
1781 
Existence of 
previous 
programs 
YES NO  YES  NO  NO  NO 
Change of 
Government 
YES YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Three main 
thematic ideas 
Infrastructure, e-
training, e-
government 
e-government, 
infrastructure, e-
training 
e-government, 
generic 
services, 
infrastructure 
e-
government, 
infrastructur
e, e-training 
e-government, 
infrastructure, 
e-business 
Infrastructure, e-
government, e-
training 
R
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leading topic  - e-government  Previously 
science and 
technology, 
now to be 
defined 
e-
government 
Neutral Infrastructure 
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Hierarchical 
level of strategic 
design 
D 
PSI, SGP, SeCyT 
under various 
ministries 
B 
Office of the 
Vice President in 
inter-ministerial 
coordination 
C 
SOCINFO 
program 
coordinated by 
the Ministry of 
Science and 
Technology 
A 
Presidential 
commission 
A 
Office of the 
President 
B 
Inter-ministerial 
Hierarchical 
level of the 
operational 
secretariat 
- 
Various programs at 
different levels 
B 
Office of the 
Vice President 
- 
Various 
programs at 
different 
government 
levels 
D 
Under-
secretariat 
for 
Economic 
Affairs 
B 
Management 
board headed 
by the Ministry 
of 
Communication
s 
D 
CONATEL 
Coordination 
style in strategic 
phase 
Parallel networks  Decentralized 
network 
Previously 
centralized 
network, now 
decentralized  
Decentralize
d network 
Centralized 
Network 
Decentralized 
network 
Coordination 
style in 
operational 
phase 
Parallel networks  To be defined  Previously 
centralized 
network, now 
to be defined  
Decentralize
d network 
Centralized 
network 
- 
Telecom 
regulator 
+++ ++  ++  +++  ++  L 
 
Ministry of 
Educational 
+++ ++  0  +++  ++  + 
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  Jamaica  Mexico  Peru  Dominican 
Republic 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Venezuela 
Current Stage  Policy 
formulation-
implementatio
n 
Implementatio
n and 
monitoring  
Policy 
formulation 
Policy 
formulation 
Policy formulation  Strategic 
vision 
Principal 
coordinator in 
the current 
stage 
Central 
Information 
Technology 
Office (CITO) 
National 
System e-
Mexico 
www.e-
méxico.gob.m
x 
Multisect-
oral 
Commis-
sion for 
Develop-
ment of the 
Information 
Society 
(CODESI) 
CNSI for 
strategy 
UDD for 
operational stage 
Steering team of the 
National Information 
and Communication 
(ICT) Plan 
www.nict.gov.tt
Ministry of 
Education, 
Culture and 
Sport, Ministry 
of 
Infrastructure, 
and Ministry 
of Science and 
Technology  
Guideline 
document 
Strategic: YES 
Operational: 
YES 
Strategic: YES 
Operational: 
NO 
Strategic: 
YES 
Operational: 
In 
preparation 
Strategic: NO 
Operational: NO 
Strategic: In 
preparation 
Operational: In 
preparation  
Strategic: NO 
Operational: 
NO 
Launch date 
decree 
March 2002  May 2001 
National 
Development 
Plan 2001, 
2006, and 
Sectoral Plan 
for 
Telecommunic
ations and 
Transport 
2001-06 
June 2003 
Ministerial 
Resolution 
181-2003-
PCM June 
2003 
August 2002 
Decree 686 2002 
October 2002 
To be approved in 
November/December 
2003 
May 2000 
Decree 825 in 
May 2000 
Existence of 
previous 
programs 
NO NO NO  NO  NO  NO 
R
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
i
e
r
a
r
c
h
i
c
a
l
 
L
e
v
e
l
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
o
p
i
c
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Change of 
government 
YES   NO   YES  NO  NO  NO 
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Three main 
thematic areas 
e-training, e-
government, 
infrastructure 
e-services, 
Infrastructure, 
integration of 
efforts 
Infrastruc-
ture, e-
government, 
e-training 
Infrastructure,  
e-government,  
e-training 
Infrastructure,  
e-government,  
e-training 
Infrastructure, 
e-training, 
human capital 
Leading topic  Neutral  Generic 
services 
- -  -  - 
Hierarchical 
level of 
strategic 
design 
B 
Interminis-
terial 
C 
Ministry of 
Communicatio
ns and 
Transport 
B 
Office of the 
President of 
the Council 
of Ministers 
A 
Technical 
Secretariat of the 
Office of the 
President 
B 
Ministry of Public 
Administration and 
Information in 
interministerial 
cooperation 
C 
Three different 
ministries 
Hierarchical 
level of the 
operational 
secretariat 
D 
Independent, 
linked to the 
Ministry of 
Trade and 
Science and 
Technology 
C 
Ministry of 
Communicatio
ns and 
Transport 
D 
Vice-
Ministry of 
Communicat
ions of the 
Ministry of 
Transport 
and 
Communicat
ions 
A 
Technical 
Secretariat of the 
Office of the 
President 
B 
Steering team 
C 
All ministries 
 
Coordination 
style in the 
strategic phase 
Centralized 
network 
Centralized 
network 
Decentralize
d network 
Centralized 
network 
Decentralized 
network 
Parallel 
networks 
Coordination 
style in 
operational 
stage 
Decentralized 
network 
Centralized 
network 
To be 
defined 
Centralized 
network 
To be defined  Parallel 
networks 
 
Telecom 
regulator 
++ +++  ++  L  +++  +++ 
 
  473.5  Fiscal and Financial Incentives for Production and Investment   
 
Fiscal and financial incentives for production and investment are, at least in principle, open to all 
producers that meet certain conditions (depending on the credit line or the fiscal incentive in 
question) regardless of whether they produce for the domestic or external markets.  For the 
purpose of the current discussion these incentives can be appropriately broken down into two 
broad categories, depending on whether a horizontal-incentive scheme or selective policies 
predominate.  Horizontal policies are employed both by countries that practice a strategy-driven 
approach and by countries that favor a demand-driven approach.  In contrast, selective policies 
are characteristic of the subset of countries practicing a strategy-driven approach; with the 
proviso that a number of countries in the region in both categories have traditionally enacted 
sector-specific tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment into their natural-resource 
sectors (mainly hydrocarbons and mining). 
This discussion of investment and production incentives starts with a description of the 
way selective policies have been implemented in the most recent period in the countries where 
the strategy-driven approach is dominant.   The discussion then gives an overview of the 
horizontal financial and fiscal support provided by the public-sector entities in the region. 
Selective Policies: The Old and the New.  In the last few years there has been a sizeable 
shift in the way selective policies are implemented in the region.  To appreciate the contrast 
between the new and the old ways, it is illustrative to begin by recalling how things were as late 
as 2001.  In that year, one of the authors
16 found, in the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
that employed selective financial and/or fiscal incentives to promote production and investment, 
that natural-resource-based sectors were the most frequent target of these incentives, which in 
most cases were designed to attract foreign direct investment (see Table 10).     
 
                                                 
16 See Melo (2001). 
  48Table 10. Financial and Fiscal Incentives for Specific Sectors  
in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Country  Loans to specific sectors (other than 
agriculture)   
Tax incentives to specific sectors 
Argentina   Mining,  forestry 
Bahamas    Hotels, financial services, spirits and beer 
Barbados    Financial services, insurance, information 
technology 
Belize   Mining 
Bolivia   Mining 
Brazil  Oil, natural gas, shipping, power 
sector, telecom, software, motion 
picture industry 
 
Chile    Forestry, oil, nuclear materials 
Colombia  Motion picture industry   
Costa Rica    Forestry, tourism 
Dominican Republic    Tourism, agribusiness 
Ecuador   Mining,  Tourism 
El Salvador  Mining; services sector
17  
Guyana   Agribusiness 
.Honduras Transport  sector,  shrimp   
Jamaica    Motion picture industry, tourism, bauxite, 
aluminum, factory construction 
Mexico  Motion picture industry  Forestry, motion picture industry, air and 
maritime transportation, publishing industry 
Nicaragua   Tourism 
Panama   Tourism,  forestry 
Peru   Tourism,  mining,  oil 
Surinam    
Trinidad and Tobago    Hotels, construction, 
Uruguay    Hydrocarbons, printing, shipping, forestry, 
military industry, airlines, newspapers, 
broadcasters, theaters, motion picture industry 
Venezuela    Hydrocarbons and other primary sectors 
Source: Melo (2001) 
 
Apart from the bias towards the natural-resource sectors, the salient feature of the 
information provided by Table 10 is that tax incentives are used much more intensively than 
credit lines as instruments to stimulate investment and production; which, naturally, again 
reflects the fact that most of the incentives are intended to promote foreign direct investment in 
traditional primary sectors.  As is well known, foreign investors are not usually credit-
constrained and therefore credit lines are not a great incentive for them.   
It can be safely presumed that most of the incentives in Table 10 are still in place
18 and 
are an integral part of the set of productive development policies in these countries.  However, 
                                                 
17 The services industries included with credit lines of their own are: tourism, transport, software, and other services. 
  49alongside them, new methods and policies have developed with the characteristic that they 
represent the future whereas the policies in Table 10 mostly represent the past. 
To illustrate the thrust of the new policies, consider the way in which the idea of the 
competitiveness fora as the expression of a public-private partnership has been developed in 
Argentina and Brazil in the last few years.  Starting in 2000 in Brazil and in 2003 in Argentina, 
competitiveness fora for a number of selected production chains have been instituted by the 
authorities.  Although, it is a safe bet that the idea of organizing such fora as the appropriate 
space for public-private dialogue and cooperation was largely inspired by the galvanizing 
Colombian experience of the National Competitiveness Conferences, the idea has undergone 
considerable changes in the hands of Argentinean and Brazilian policymakers.  As already 
pointed out, the main change is that the competitiveness fora now exist in the context of a 
strategy-driven approach and as a tool of that policy approach. In addition, the Argentinean and 
Brazilian organizational format introduces two major changes vis-à-vis the Colombian model.  
First, the fora are production-chain specific; consequently, there is nothing to compare with the 
National Competitiveness Conferences, which have played such a prominent role in the 
Colombian experience.  Second, Argentina and Brazil have not replicated the thematic networks 
of the Colombian scheme.   
Not unlike the Colombian model, the Argentine and Brazilian fora are intended to 
diagnose the obstacles to competitiveness faced by the selected production chains and to agree 
on action plans and commitments to remove those obstacles.  The Brazilian initiative also 
introduces the device of Competitiveness Contracts between government, entrepreneurs and 
workers, which define the commitments assumed by all the stakeholders represented in a 
particular forum.  At this time, nine competitiveness fora have been established in Argentina and 
16 in Brazil. 
Obviously, the idea and practice of the competitiveness fora include a strong element of 
demand-side determination of policy measures.  However, it is still the case that, in Brazil and 
Argentina, the priority sectors include not only the existing export sectors, but also the 
production chains to which national industrial polices have given priority.  Moreover, some of 
the priority sectors have the status of infant industries for economic development purposes, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
18 A well-known exception is the change in the taxation and royalty regime for private investment in the 
hydrocarbons sector in Venezuela under President Chávez’s administration. 
  50receive treatment as such. This is especially clear in the Argentine case, where these production 
chains have received differential treatment and are now the subject of special promotion legal 
regimes.
19 These special legal regimes include tax stability over a 10-year horizon; exemption 
from income tax on profits; exemption from import duties on inputs, materials, and equipment to 
be used in R&D projects; and the establishment of sector-specific funds to finance investment 
projects and contribute venture and seed capital to the creation of new firms in the selected 
sectors.
20 More consolidated sectors participating in the competitiveness-fora framework, such as 
the civil-construction materials sector and the wood-and-furniture chain, are supported in a 
variety of ways (in areas such as labor training, quality improvement, foreign trade facilitation, 
market information, and strategic planning), but they do not have a special promotional regime 
and thus do not receive any substantial fiscal or financial incentives.  In particular, unlike the 
cases of software and biotechnology, they do not receive the benefit of a sector-specific financial 
fund for investment projects. 
Horizontal Policies.  According to Melo (2001), horizontal credit is provided by public 
national development banks
21 in 15 countries in the region.  Most of them operate as second-tier 
institutions and charge market-determined interest rates.  In most countries, credit for producers 
is usually granted in two basic modalities: (1) medium-term loans to finance working capital; (2) 
long-term loans to finance investment projects (including the discrete purchase of fixed assets). 
Table 11, taken from ECLAC (2004), provides an overview of the credit activities and 
portfolio structure of six major public development banks (including two banks specializing in 
export finance).  It is interesting to note that, in descending order, industry, agriculture, and the 
category of other services are the largest beneficiaries of public development bank lending in the 
sample considered. 
 
                                                 
19 For instance, the Promotional Regime for Software and the Promotional Regime for Biotechnology Industries. 
20 Among the sector-specific funds, the biotechnology and software-industry funds have received special attention 
from the authorities.   
21 A number of provincial and, more generally, sub-national public development banks will not be taken into 
account in this discussion, which is mainly concerned with the productive development policies of national 
governments.  
  51Table 11. Public Development Banks in Five Latin American Countries, Credit and Portfolio Structure by Sector, 2002 
 
  Agricultu
re and 
fishing* 
Mining  Construc
tion++ 
Industry  Commer
ce 
Transpor
t 
Tourism  Other 
services 
Other++
+ 
Total 
Millions 
of dollars 
credit 
approved 
          
BNDES 
(Brazil) 
1516 84  264  5811 417  894  47  3509 0  12542 
BANCO
MEXT 
(Mexico) 
1650 n.a.  651  3557 n.a.  n.a.  326  809  0  6993 
COFIDE 
(Peru) 
125  15 100  102  42 18 3  32 0  437 
Portfolio            
BANCOL
DEX 
(Colombi
a) 
223 30  n.d. 619 n.a. n.a. n.a. 41  239 1152 
BNCR 
(Costa 
Rica) 
133 n.a. 25  130 162 11  29  115 449 1053 
NAFIN 
(Mexico) 
2 
 
9 209  12  158  0 0 84  16256  16730 
Percenta
ge 
structure 
Credit 
approved  
             
BNDES 
(Brazil) 
12.1 0.7  2.1  46.3 3.3  7.1  0.4  28.0 0.0  100.0 
BANCO
MEXT 
(Mexico) 
23.6   9.3  50.9     4.7  11.6 0.0  100.0 
COFIDE 
(Peru) 
28.7  3.5 22.9  23.4  9.5 4.2 0.6 7.2 0.0 100.0 
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Portfolio            
BANCOL
DEX 
(Colombi
a) 
19.4 2.6    53.8       3.5  20.7 100.0 
BNCR 
(Costa 
Rica) 
12.6   2.3  12.3 15.4 1.0  2.7  10.9 42.6 100.0 
NAFIN 
(Mexico) 
0.0 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 97.2  100.0 
Source: ECLAC (2004). 
*For BANCOLDEX and BANCOMEXT, figures include the agribusiness sector. 
++ For BANCOMEXT and NAFIN, figures correspond to financing for public-enterprise infrastructure projects. 
+++For NAFIN, the activity breakdown only includes the private sector. Others include: the financial, public and external sectors, other non-
specified activities, and interbank credit.  For BANCOLDEX, the figure corresponds to unclassified loans in portfolio, excluding discounted 
bills totaling US$6.3 million. For BNDES, figures exclude stock market operations totaling US$270 million.  
 
  53Following Melo (2001), horizontal tax incentives in one form or another were used by 10 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.  These horizontal tax schemes take two basic 
forms.  First, in the case of the Caribbean countries, they are mostly tax holidays designed to 
attract foreign investment, namely in Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Haiti, Surinam, and Trinidad-
Tobago.  Chile has tax incentives for investment (including re-investment of profits).  Paraguay 
has a five-year tax holiday for investment. Uruguay has a tax exemption on profits reinvested in 
manufacturing firms, farming, and hotel facilities, while Venezuela gives a 20 percent tax rebate 
to investments in most non-mining and non-oil industries and has a capital gains tax of only 1 
percent. 
 
3.6  A Preliminary Assessment of Current Productive Development Policies in the Region  
 
The task of critically assessing the productive development policies in the region faces a major 
obstacle with the absence of systematic quantitative data on the scale of interventions, as well as 
on their outcomes and impacts.  In regard to the scale of interventions, to the best of our 
knowledge there are no reliable data on the fiscal cost of industrial policies for the countries.  
Even the data on the resources used by the financial public sector to provide credit and other 
forms of financial assistance to enterprises are incomplete.  In regard to outcomes and impacts, 
the scant development of the results-oriented approaches to public-sector management in Latin 
American and Caribbean countries means that public-sector interventions to promote productive 
development typically lack the battery of base-line and outcome and impact indicators that third-
party observers need to evaluate their effectiveness in achieving the stated objectives.  Under 
these circumstances, assessments can only be qualitative and preliminary until a sufficient 
amount of hard data becomes available. 
To begin with, we would like to repeat the claim of one of the authors in a recent paper 
(Rodríguez-Clare, 2005) that Latin America’s incursions into activist development policies have 
been timid and inconsistent.  To a great extent, this has to do with the fact that productive 
development policies have been hampered by their association in the minds of many with the 
old-type, import-substitution industrial policies. Although they are staging something of a 
comeback, there is still some way to go before a broad consensus on their potentialities and 
limits is formed.  Moreover, in an era of increasing globalization, quite a few analytical and 
institutional issues have to be settled before the emerging productive development policies for 
  54open economies can become as reliable a part of the policymakers’ toolbox as, say, fiscal and 
monetary policies are at present. 
The clearest expression of the widespread timidity in implementing existing productive 
development policies is the scarce resources devoted to them.  Although available information is 
limited—as noted above—the amount of resources mobilized by public development banks as a 
percentage of GDP, shown in Table 12, indicates how limited they are.  Taking South Korea as a 
benchmark, the table shows that even Mexico and Brazil, which make a sizeable effort in 
absolute terms, fall short of the South Korean figure of 6.5 percent of GDP.  The only country in 
the same effort-category is Costa Rica, where the loan portfolio of the Banco Nacional de Costa 
Rica amounts to an impressive 6.5 percent of GDP.   All along the funding of productive policies 
has suffered from the chronic budgetary constraints on the public sectors in countries with low 
tax-to-GDP ratios—an almost universal characteristic of Latin American tax structures. These 
constraints intensify during periods of fiscal adjustments  
 
Table 12. Credit Granted by Public Development Banks 
  Brazil 
(BNDES) 
Colombia 
(BANCOLDEX) 
Costa Rica 
(BNCR) 
Mexico 
(BANCOMEXT 
+ NAFIN) 
 
Peru 
(COFIDE) 
South 
Korea 
Total credit 
(in US$) 
millions 
12,542 1,152  1,090  23,723  573  45,844 
As a 
percentage 
of GDP 
2.8 1.4  6.5  3.7  1.0  6.7 
Sources: ECLAC (2004), except for Korea, Costa Rica and Peru.  Credit figures for these three countries are from 
the Korean Development Bank (http://www.kdb.co.kr/), Costa Rica’s General Superintendency of Financial 
Entities (http://www.sugef.fi.cr/), and Peru’s Financial Corporation for Development (http://www.cofide.com.pe/).  
Note: GDP figures for calculations are from the World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2004, 
http://www.worldbank.org/.   
 
Among the pressing needs competing for budgetary funds (for instance, the need to 
increase social spending), industrial policy funding requirements tend to get overlooked or 
simply rejected.  In part, this outcome is also attributable to a more vigilant (and very healthy) 
attitude towards rent-seeking.  The lessons learned from the social costs of the pervasive rent-
seeking of the import-substitution era have not been forgotten; as a result, many see industrial 
policies—most of the time with no real justification—as suspicious.  Frequently, a vicious circle 
sets in: agencies responsible for industrial policies, lacking adequate support and a strong 
  55constituency, are allocated limited budgetary resources; they perform below needs and 
expectations and lose reputation and weight in the state power structure; their limited 
constituency tends to shrink further; new budgetary allocations become even scarcer, and a new 
round of under-performance, loss of reputation and new budgetary restrictions gets under way.  
As ECLAC (2004) concludes, implementation failures and the perception that “policies do not 
work” undermine the agencies’ legitimacy among the entrepreneurs and, paradoxically, lead to a 
situation where “entrepreneurs bemoan the lack of resources available for policies while at the 
same time failing to make full use of what is available.” 
Budgetary constraints are not, however, the only factor explaining underperformance.  
Weak institutional capacity is widespread in the region’s public sectors and goes a long way to 
explaining the ineffectiveness of many policies.  We hasten to add, however, that a number of 
the institutions responsible for productive development policies belong to the islands of 
competence and efficiency that can be found in almost every country in the region.  These 
include some of the technology institutions, public development banks and export promotion 
agencies where some of the best human capital in the region’s public sectors is employed. 
Apart from funding, implementation, and institutional capacity issues, some weaknesses 
have to do with the fact that policymakers are still finding their way even as they are immersed 
in the daily challenges of policymaking and implementation. A lot of experimentation is going 
on in the region.  Trial and error and learning by doing are unavoidable in a historical 
circumstance where unprecedented challenges are faced.  Just to name a few: the WTO 
agreements impose constraints on industrial policies; regional and bilateral trade agreements 
impose additional—sometimes even stronger—constraints; international competition is fiercer 
than ever; technological gaps literally increase by the day, and so on.  Much of this 
experimentation is relevant, fresh and promising but there is also a good deal that is reactive, 
improvised, or inspired by passing fads.
22                                    
A particular weakness in the intellectual climate of industrial policy formulation in a 
number countries in the region—but by no means all—is that, judging by the existing policies, 
the lessons from other regions of the world have not really been learned.  For instance, two key 
policy principles from the East Asian experiences—that subsidies must be contingent on 
                                                 
22 For instance, in our view much of what is said and done in relation to clusters has the appearance of a superficial, 
unreflective adherence to a fashionable trend.   
  56performance, and that they must be temporary—are absent in many of the support policies 
adopted in countries in the region.            
However, on the positive side, some features of the emerging productive development 
policies constitute genuine contributions to the arsenal of economic development thinking and 
practice.  First, the idea of a public-private partnership working towards key development 
objectives (such as improving competitiveness and raising productivity), together with 
systematic, organized public-private dialogues to discuss problem diagnoses, policy measures, 
and action commitments are major contributions to shaping the industrial policies of the future.  
In these public-private dialogues the joint effort to identify the problems and possible solutions is 
a harbinger of the new style of industrial policymaking taking shape the world over where the 
process of discovery—or self-discovery as Hausmann and Rodrik (2002) call it—of the potential 
competitive advantages and the obstacles to their development is as important as the content of 
the policies adopted to overcome them.
23
Second, the sheer amount of experimentation currently taking place in the region is a 
feature of all processes of innovation.  New ways and means of policymaking are tried and put to 
the hard tests of reality, conflicting domestic interests, and competition from abroad.  The 
ongoing learning process is a necessary stage in the move towards new more consistent and less 
timid policy frameworks where productive development policies can develop their potential to 
effectively contribute to the goals of economic growth and modernization.  As the Spanish poet 
Antonio Machado wrote: “Wayfarer there is no road; you find your way as you walk.”        
   
                                                 
23 This issue is intelligently discussed in a penetrating article by Rodrik (2004).  
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